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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
J. STANLEY FRY and BEVERLY 
FRY, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
- v s -
DUCE SPORTING GOODS, INC., a 
Utah corporation, 
Defendant/Respondent and 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
- v s -
STARFIRE INDUSTRIES, INC., a 
Utah corporation, and HARDIN MARINE, 
Third Party Defendants. : 
Case No. 14095 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by the Plaintiffs/Appellants J . Stanley Fry 
and Beverly Fry against the Defendant/Respondent Duce Sporting Goods, 
Inc. for rescission of a contract to purchase a power boat and for damages 
as a result of breaches of express and implied warranties. A Counterclaim 
was filed by Duce against the Plaintiffs for the unpaid balance on the 
contract. 
A Third Party Complaint was filed by Defendant/Respondent 
and Third Party Plaintiff Duce Sporting Goods, Inc. against Third Party 
Defendants Starfire Industries, Inc. who manufactured the boat and Hardin 
Marine who supplied some of the component parts, claiming damages for 
breach of express and implied warranties. 
The parties will be referred to herein as they appear in the 
lower court. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried before Judge Bryant H. Croft, sitting * 
m 
without a jury, on the 21st and 24th days of June, 1974 and at the completion 
i 
of the Plaintiffs1 case, the Motion to Dismiss of the Defendant Duce Sporting 
Goods, Inc. was granted by the Court. Thereafter, a Judgment was «• 
. , m 
entered in favor of the Defendant Duce Sporting Goods, Inc. and against the 
Plaintiffs J. Stanley Fry and Beverly Fry for the unpaid balance on the contract^ 
for the purchase of the power boat. • 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Plaintiffs seek to have the Order dismissing their 'm 
Complaint and the Judgment against them for the balance due on the contract « 
set aside and further seek a Judgment in their favor and against the 
m 
Defendant rescinding the contract and for consequential damages.
 m 
STATEMENT OF FACTS • 
« 
The Plaintiff J. Stanley Fry and his wife Beverly Fry are 
m 
avid water skiers, having been engaged in this sport for approximately m 
25 and 15 years, respectively- (R. 174, 175, 396) For several years prior m 
m 
to 1972 they had owned a 19 foot Higgins inboard power boat which was used 
for water skiing and general pleasure boating. (R. 176) 
The Higgins boat owned by Mr. and Mrs., Fry would travel 
at approximately 45 mph and would accelerate rapidly and pull two adult 
water skiers with a load of five to six people in the boat without difficulty. 
(R. 176, 332, 355, 397) 
At the outset it should be noted that one of the requirements 
for a power boat which is used to pull water skiers is that it be able to 
accelerate rapidly in order to pull the water skiers out of the water and 
have them plane on the surface of the water. (R. 282, 316, 137, 355, 358, 
385) 
Mr. and Mrs . Fry were acquainted with one Fe r r a i Holding, 
a salesman for the Defendant Duce Sporting Goods, Inc . , hereinafter 
referred to as Duce, and he had ridden in the Higgins boat owned by the 
Frys and had observed its performance. (R. 190, 245) The Frys were 
desirous of obtaining a power boat with the same or better performance < 
characterist ics as the Higgins boat and with the additional comforts such 
as a deeper hull and sleeping quarters . (R. 177, 183) Mr. Fry shopped 
at several boat dealers and found nothing in stock which he felt would 
meet his requirements. (R. 184) 
Mr. Fry informed Holding, the salesman for Duce, of his 
desire to purchase a new boat and they inspected the power boats which 
were in stock at Duce and found nothing of the type which the Frys wished 
to purchase. As a result of this, Mr. Fry was taken by Holding to the 
place of business of the Third Party Defendant Starfire Industries, Inc. , 
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hereinafter referred to as Starfire. Starfire is in the business of 
manufacturing boats. (R. 185) There was some discussion about the 
purchase of a Starfire boat with twin engines, however, this was 
unacceptable to Mr. F ry . (R. 181) The representatives of Starfire sug-
gested to Mr. Fry and Holding that he purchase a 22 foot Starfire hull 
and power the same with a 455 cubic inch Oldsmobile engine coupled with 
a Jacuzzi jet pump. (R. 186) Fry was not familiar with the Oldsmobile 
engine but was familiar with a 454 cubic inch Chevrolet engine which a 
friend of his had in a jet pump boat and inquired if this could be used in 
lieu of the Oldsmobile engine. The representatives of Starfire told him 
they had conferred with the Third Party Defendant Hardin Marine, herein-
after referred to as Hardin, concerning the engine and jet pump and that the 
same would work satisfactorily. (R. 187, 188) Hardin is engaged in the 
business of adapting engines to jet pumps for power boats. (R. 412) 
After the representation had been made to Mr. Fry by 
Starfire that the Chevrolet engine, Jacuzzi jet pump and 22 foot Starfire 
were compatible, which representation was made in the presence of 
Holding, he made a down payment to Duce and requested that they order 
the boat. On August 29, 1972 a Retail Installment Contract was entered 
into between the F rys and Duce for the purchase of the assembled boat 
for a total cash purchase price in the sum of $10,114. 55 and a deferred 
payment price of $13,425.35. (R. 188) 
The assembled boat was delivered to Duce by Starfire with 
the engine and jet pump assembled. Thereafter it was tested by Duce in 
their shop tank and Mr. Fry was advised by Duce that it performed sa t i s -
factorily. (R. 190) The boat was then delivered to the Plaintiffs a few days 
prior to the Labor Day weekend of 1972. At this time Mr. and Mrs . F ry , 
several friends, including Holding, took the boat to Utah Lake for a test 
drive and when the throttle was opened up, the engine rpm's accelerated 
rapidly, however, the boat vibrated and sank back into the water. (Rl 191) 
The boat was tried again after most of the passengers had gotten out of the 
same and the same problem ensued. The Plaintiffs were advised by Holding 
that the boat was cavitating which is caused by air , as opposed to water, 
going into the Jacuzzi jet pump which results in a loss of thrust or propul-
sion, even though the engine rpm's are high. Holding informed Mr. and 
Mrs . Fry that the boat probably only needed some minor adjustment. 
(R. 192, 193) 
Thereafter, the boat was taken to Bear Lake by the Frys and 
used during the Labor Day weekend and was then stored for the winter. 
When the boating season arrived in the late spring and early summer of 
1973, Mr. Fry returned the boat to Duce at their request on approximately 
six occasions for adjustments and modifications in an attempt to remedy 
the defect. (R. 195, 209, 219, 400) 
The boat was used during the boating season of 1973, however, 
it was virtually without use as a water ski boat. According to the testimony 
of the Plaintiffs J. Stanley F ry and Beverly Fry , as well as Dick Williams, 
John Reimer, Louis C. Lorenze and Homer Miller, who are all avid water 
skiers and familiar with other propeller driven and jet pump powered boats, 
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the Starflre boat is unacceptable for this purpose. (R. 212, 213, 282, 310, 
316, 317, 333, 337, 348, 358, 360, 387, 388, 399) Mr. Reimer indicated 
it took from 20 to 25 seconds for the Starfire boat to pull up a water skier 
and that this was contrasted with a maximum of five seconds for all other 
m 
water ski boats with which he was familiar. Because of the slow aecelera- i 
g 
tion, the water skier is dragged through the water for what was described 
as several blocks and the skiers often times are unable to get out of the
 g 
water and plane on the surface. (R. 334-336) • 
n 
According to the testimony of Barry Lieberman of Hardin, 
• . i 
the cavitation and the failure of the boat to accelerate properly is caused
 i 
by the incompatibility of the engine in question with the jet pump which was « 
i 
utilized and that this combination is not recommended by them or the manu-
:
 i 
facturers of the Jacuzzi jet pump. (R. 416r418, 435, 438) • 
In summary, the boat is completely unacceptable for the purpose *! 
i 
for which it was purchased by the Plaintiffs, which purpose was known by 
i 
Duce at the time the contract was entered into* i 
ARGUMENT i 
i 
POINT I 
_ .
 f 
THE EVIDENCE MUST BE REVIEWED IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE • 
TO PLAINTIFFS' THEORY OF THE CASE. 1 
I 
As was noted above, the Motion to Dismiss by the Defendait 
! 
Duce was granted at the completion of the presentation of the Plaintiffs1 • 
case. (R. 115-117) . • ! 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has , on numerous 
- 6 - < 
i 
occasions, held that if a dismissal or a non-suit is granted, the evidence 
must be viewed in the light most favorable to the position of the party 
against whom the motion was granted. In this regard, the Court in the 
case of Caldwell v. Anschutz Drilling Co. , 13 Utah 2d 177, 369 P. 2d 964, 
stated as follows: 
11
.. .After the presentation of the plaintiffs1 
evidence, the trial court granted defendants' 
motion to dismiss , from which plaintiffs 
appeal. Under those circumstances, we 
consider the evidence and every reasonable 
inference that may be derived therefrom in 
the light most favorable to the plaintiffs1 
theory of their case, u 
For other cases reiterating this fundamental principle of law, 
see Anderson v. Parson Red-E-Mix Co. , 24 Utah 2d 128, 467 P. 2d 45; 
Ewan v. Butters, 16 Utah 2d 272, 399 P. 2d 210; Wilkerson v. Stevens, 
16 Utah 2d 424, 403 P. 2d 31 and Newton v. State Road Commission, 23 Utah 
2d 350, 463 P. 2d 565. 
POINT II 
THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE A VALID CLAIM AGAINST DUCE FOR BREACH 
OF EXPRESS WARRANTIES. 
It is the contention of the Plaintiffs that Defendant Duce 
made express warranties to them concerning the boat in question and that 
the same were breached. In this regard Section 70A-2-313, Utah Code 
Annotated, provides in part as follows: 
"Express warranties by affirmation, promise, 
description, sample. - (1) Express warranties 
by the sel ler are created as follows: 
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise 
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made by the sel ler to the buyer which re la tes to 
the goods and becomes part of the basis of the 
bargain creates an express warranty that the 
goods shall conform to the affirmation or 
promise. 
"(2) It is not necessary to the creation of 
an express warranty that the sel ler use formal 
words such as 'warrant1 or !guarantee ! o r that 
he have a specific intention to make a w a r r a n t y , . . . t f 
There is no question but that Duce sold the power boat in 
question to the Plaintiffs and, therefore, is a "seller11 within the meaning 
of the foregoing statutes. And, as was noted in the Statement of Facts , 
F e r r a l Holding, the salesman for Duce who handled the transaction with 
the Plaintiffs, was aware of the requirements which Plaintiffs needed in the 
boat which they intended to purchase. 
Plaintiffs concede that at the time the contract was entered 
into the representations which were made to them that the Chevrolet engine 
and the Jacuzzi jet pump were compatible and would result in a high per -
formance water ski and pleasure power boat, were made by Starfire. 
However, it is important to note that it was the representatives of Duce 
who took the Plaintiffs to Starfire with the intent of selling them a boat to 
be manufactured by the lat ter and that the representatives of Duce were 
present when the representations were made. 
It is the position of the Plaintiffs that Duce becomes bound 
by the representations made by i ts supplier Starfire directly to the 
Plaintiffs once it entered into the contract for the sale of the property. To 
hold otherwise would allow a seller who has profited from the sale to 
escape any liability for failure of merchandise sold by him to conform to 
representations made concerning it which he knew were the basis for the 
transaction being entered into. 
For a case with a factual situation similar to the instant 
case which holds the sel ler liable for representations made by its supplier, 
see Carver v. Denn, 117 Utah 180, 214 P. 2d 118. In that case the buyer had 
negotiated for the purchase of air conditioning equipment for his store with 
one Maycock prior to entering into a contract for the furnishing of the same 
with the sel ler . The seller apparently knew of the representations of his 
supplier, Maycock, and in holding that he was responsible for the same, the 
Court stated as follows: 
"Plaintiff [seller] lastly seeks to be relieved of 
liability for breach of warranty by claiming that 
defendant did not rely on his skill or judgment 
since he did not enter into the negotiations until 
after the type of cooler had been agreed upon. 
The primary negotiations for the installation of 
this cooler were between George Maycock and the 
defendant [buyer] but the contract for the sale and 
installation was not agreed upon between them. . . . 
Plaintiff might have elected to submit his bid to 
Maycock or to bid only on the installation and let 
Maycock submit a separate bid, but he elected to 
go further than this. He elected to become the 
seller of the machine and in so doing he adopted 
Maycock as his representative for the sale. 
He knew that Maycock had been negotiating with 
defendant for the installation of a cooling system 
and agreed to join with Maycock in the venture. 
His pr imary responsibility under the contract was 
to install a satisfactory air conditioning system 
which required satisfactory equipment and proper 
installation. He was aware of the fact that defen-
dant was unfamiliar with conditioning installations 
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and must accept the skill and judgment of the 
part ies participating in the sale and installa-
tions. Plaintiff was willing to enter into some 
kind of arrangement with Maycocks so that he 
could become the sel ler . . . . Plaintiff, having 
elected to take the benefits of Maycockrs sales 
activities and knowing that defendant must rely 
on both for a satisfactory installation, is 
charged with the responsibility of furnishing an 
installation which must be reasonably fit for the 
purpose intended.' • [Emphasis added] 
In the instant case the evidence is clearly to the effect that 
based upon the representations of Starfire that the boat hull, engine and 
jet pump were compatible and that the assembled boat would perform as 
required by the Plaintiffs, the contract was entered into. Thus, the r ep re -
sentations were the "basis of the bargain11 and fall squarely within the 
meaning of the foregoing statute. J 
As was noted in the Statement of Fac ts , there is a multitude 
of evidence that the boat is seriously deficient as a water ski boat, which 
was one of the primary purposes for which it was purchased, and this does 
not appear to be seriously contested by Duce or any other party to the 
action. This constitutes a breach of the express warrant ies and gives r i se 
to a valid claim in the Plaintiffs. 
POINT HI 
THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE A VALID CLAIM FOR BREACH OF IMPLIED 
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY. 
Again, as was noted in the Statement of Facts , the evidence 
affirmatively shows that the boat purchased by the Plaintiffs from Duce did 
not perform in the manner of other power boats of s imilar size and horse-
-10-
power which rendered the same unuseable as a water ski boat. 
Section 70A-2-314, Utah Code Annotated, provides in 
part as follows: 
"Implied warranty - Merchantability - Usage 
of trade. .- (1) Unless excluded or modified 
(section 70A-2-316), a warranty that the goods 
shall be merchantable is implied in a contract 
for their sale if the seller is a merchant with 
respect to goods of that kind. . . . 
"(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least 
such as 
(a) pass without objection in the trade under 
the contract description; and. 
(c) are fit for the ordinary purpose for 
which such goods are used;— !f 
In order for the Plaintiffs to come within the scope of this 
statute, the first requirement is that the seller be a "merchant with 
respect to goods of that kind. ! ! It is not disputed that Duce is engaged in 
the business of selling power boats and, in fact, sold the boat to the 
Plaintiffs which is the subject matter of this lawsuit. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the trial court in granting the 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss held that nDuce was not a merchant dealing 
in boats of the kind here sold. " (R. 110) This was based upon the fact that 
Duce had not sold a boat with this particular engine and jet pump installed 
in it on any prior occasion and by way of analogy the Court stated as follows: 
11
.. .An automobile dealer who sells only 
Volkswagens can hardly be said to be a 
merchant with respect to a Lincoln Continental 
equipped with a Cadillac motor which such 
dealer might upon one occasion sel l . f ! 
With all due respect to the tr ial Judge, he is incorrect in his 
- 1 1 -
assessment of the law on this subject. In commenting upon the issue in 
question the editors in Anderson Uniform Commercial Code, 2nd Edition, 
state as follows: 
m 
11
 The limiting concept of being a merchant 
!with respect to goods of that kind1 is to be 
liberally construed so as to embrace any
 m 
products that are sold within the general 
category in which the defendait has been 
dealing, ~
 m 
11
 Consequently the implied warranty of 
merchantability ar i ses with respect to the « 
fitness of a hammer for ordinary purposes 
where sold by a building mater ia ls supplier 
who sold the particular manufacturer 's • 
line of goods, even though he had not sold
 g 
this particular hammer before. ! ! (Citing 
Mutual Services of Highland Park, Inc. v. i 
S, O. S. Plumbing & Sewerage Co. , 93 III.
 § 
App.2d 257, 235 N.E.2d 265) Vol. 1, p. 581 
. i 
The evidence readily establishes that Duce was engaged in the
 M 
sale of power boats and initiated steps to locate the component parts which • 
i 
were assembled into the power boat which it ultimately sold to the Plaintiffs. 
•. i 
It is also apparent that this type of sales transaction is common place for sales j 
of automobiles, motor boats, trucks, t ractors and other machinery where the • 
i 
re ta i ler has at his disposal the wherewithal to order and obtain many different 
i 
combinations of body styles, colors, engines, t ransmissions, etc. for auto-
 M 
mobiles and various hulls, engines, drives, etc. for power boats and a like f 
i 
composition for other types of machinery. If the ruling of the tr ial court 
i 
were followed it would lead to the absurd conclusion that because the par t i - i 
cular automobile dealer, boat dealer or other sel ler had not sold an ! 
automobile, boat, or other product of that specific makeup on a pr ior 
i 
- 1 2 - < 
occasion, he would have no liability if the product was defective. 
The second requirement in order for Plaintiff to prevail on a 
claim based upon breach of warranty of merchantability imposed by the 
statute, is to show that the boat did not pass without objection in the trade 
or that it was not fit for the ordinary purpose for which boats of this type 
a re used. The evidence is clear and not seriously disputed by Duce that the 
boat did not perform as expected by them and as required by the Plaintiffs 
and as other boats of similar horse power and design would perform. In 
this regard, the testimony of Barry Lieberman of Hardin, which is a 
company whose business is primarily adapting engines to jet drives for 
power boats, is in part as follows: 
,fQ. With respect to the 454 Chevrolet engine 
and the 12YJ Jacuzzi pump, do you have those 
plans and specifications? 
"A. No, s i r . 
"Q. Why not? 
"A. The engine is not recommended for that. 
The pump is not recommended for that type of 
horsepower. 
UQ. Why isn't the 12YJ recommended? 
"A. The horsepower is too great for the 
impeller at this point. . . . 
• * * 
nQ. Do you know whether or not anything was 
said or done with respect to the mating of the 
454 Chevrolet with the 12YJ Jacuzzi pump? 
11
 A. As soon as we found out that engine was in 
that boat with that pump, we recommended - -
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again, you have two choices; either to change 
the pump to a 12 WJ or change the motor back to 
an acceptable motor that will not cavitate that 
pump. 
n Q. Let me ask it in this way: You said the 
manufacturer of Jacuzzi does not recommend 
or does not specify the use of the Y-pump with the 
454 horsepower engine, right? 
"A. Right. 
!IQ. And the problem described in the letter is 
the reason why these two units are not by design 
put together without some testing being made? 
"A. Right. 
!!Q. Did I understand correctly that jet propulsion . x - -
of boats is your part icular specialty? 
"A. Yes . , ! (R. 417, 432, 436, 437, 438) 
As can be clearly seen by the testimony of Mr. Lieberman 
and of other witnesses concerning the performance of the boat, the same 
fails to pass without objection in the trade and is not fit for the ordinary 
purpose for which such a boat is normally used. 
The contention is made by Duce that the Plaintiff J . Stanley 
Pry was the person who specified the 454 Chevrolet engine. However, the 
evidence is to the effect that the Plaintiff was familiar with this particular 
type of engine and inquired of Duce and Starfire if the same would be 
acceptable and was advised that it would be. However, even if the Court 
concluded that the Plaintiff specified the engine and relied upon his own 
-14-
judgment in this regard, such a finding would not preclude a recovery 
based upon breach of warranty of merchantability. In the Official Code 
Comment to Section 2-314 of the Uniform Commercial Code, the 
following is noted: 
" 3 . A specific designation of goods by the 
buyer does not exclude the se l le r ' s obligation 
that they be fit for the general purposes appro-
priate to such goods.11 
Nor is it a defense to the claim of breach of warranty of 
merchantability that Duce did not assemble the component par t s , namely 
the boat hull, Chevrolet engine and jet pump, but relied upon the workman-
ship and expertise of its sel lers and suppliers. In this regard, Anderson 
Uniform Commercial Code, Volume 1, 2d Edition, page 565 provides as 
follows: 
"The warranty liability of a manufacturer 
under the Code is not affected by the fact that 
the defect which constitutes the breach of 
warranty was a defect in the component part 
which the manufacturer had purchased from 
another manufacturer and had merely incorp-
orated in his own product. . • . " 
A case which is somewhat analogous to the fact situation in the 
instant case is Hunt v. Perkins Machinery Co. , 352 Mass. 535, 226 N. E. 2d 
228. In that case the Plaintiff, who was a boat owner, purchased a marine 
engine from the Defendant who was engaged in that business and the evidence 
indicated that the engine gave off excessive quantities of black smoke when 
running and Defendant was unable to cure the defect after numerous attempts 
to do so. Based upon this and the fact that the evidence indicated that 
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Plaintiff relied upon the Defendant in purchasing the type of engine in 
question, the Court found there were breaches of both warranties of 
merchantability and of fitness for a particular purpose under Sections 
2-314 and 2-315 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 
In the case of Rudolph v. Huckman, 267 A. 2d 896, a new boat 
purchased by the Plaintiff manifested numerous defects and became 
inoperable after very limited use and the Court held that the evidence was 
sufficient to establish that the defects existed at the time the goods were 
delivered from the sel ler to the buyer. 
The important concept of the statute in question is that it 
imposes an implied warranty of merchantability upon a sel ler for the product 
sold by him without regard to any affirmative representation which he may 
or may not have made concerning the same. Reliance or lack thereof of the 
buyer on any representations made is not necessary,to recover . Fur ther , 
any negligence on the part of the sel ler or any diligence or lack thereof 
which he may or may not have exercised in connection with the sale of the 
product is not relevant. All that need be shown is that the seller is a 
merchant with respect to goods of the kind sold and that the product is 
defective as defined in the statute. It is amply clear from the evidence 
in this mat ter that the boat was defective which has resulted in the damage 
complained of by Plaintiffs. 
POINT IV 
THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE A VALID CLAIM FOR BREACH OF IMPLIED 
WARRANTY OF FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. 
-16-
It is the contention of the Plaintiffs that Duce breached an 
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose in connection with the 
sale of the boat in question. Section 70A-2-315, Utah Code Annotated, 
provides as follows: 
"Implied warranty - Fitness for particular 
purpose. - Where the seller at the time of 
contracting has reason to know any particular 
purpose for which the goods are required and 
that the buyer is relying on the sel ler fs skill 
or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, 
there is unless excluded or modified under the 
next section an implied warranty that the goods 
shall be fit for such purpose." 
In the instant case the evidence discloses that Duce, through its 
agent, Holding, was familiar with the type of boat which Plaintiffs desired, 
i . e . a high performance water skiing and pleasure boat. Also, Defendant 
Duce was engaged in the business of selling power boats and after it became 
apparent that they had nothing in stock which would satisfy the particular 
needs of the Plaintiffs, they took it upon themselves to attempt to obtain 
such a boat for them and it was at this point that the meeting with Starfire 
took place. The Plaintiffs relied upon the skill and judgment of Duce and 
its suppliers, Starfire and Hardin, to furnish him with a high performance 
water skiing boat. 
In this instance, even though the boat moves forward and 
remains afloat, it does not perform as had been required by the Plaintiffs 
and, thus, it fails to fit the "particular purpose11 for which it was required. 
In this regard, the Official Code Comments provide as follows : 
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A 'particular purpose1 differs from the ordi-
nary purpose for which goods are used in that 
it envisions a specific use by the buyer which is 
peculiar to the nature of its business whereas 
the ordinary purpose for which goods are used 
are those envisioned in the concept of merchant-
ability and go to the uses which are customarily 
v made of the goods in question. For example, 
shoes are generally used for the purpose of 
walking upon ordinary ground, but a se l ler may 
know that a particular pair was selected to be 
used for climbing mountains. 
11A contract may, of course, include both a warranty 
of merchantability and one of fitness for a par t i -
cular purpose. , ! [Emphasis added] 
As was noted in the Statement of Facts , the Plaintiff J . Stanley 
Fry suggested the particular engine used in this instance because he was 
familiar with it, however, this was a mere suggestion on his part and he 
relied upon the expertise of Duce and its supplier in making a determination 
that the boat hull and jet pump were compatible with the engine which he 
suggested. 
In order for Duce to asse r t a defense on the grounds that the 
Plaintiff requested a particular type of engine, it must be shown that he 
furnished precise technical specifications and that the se l ler merely followed 
these. In the case of Aluminum Co. of America v. Electro Flo Corp. , 
451 F.2d 1115, the United States Court of Appeals of the Tenth Circuit 
affirmed a ruling by Judge A. Sherman Christensen of the United States 
District Court for the District of Utah in favor of a buyer based on a breach 
of a claim of warranty for a particular purpose. In addressing itself to the 
proposition set forth above, the Court stated as follows: 
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"Second, Alcoa argues that goods manufactured 
to a buyer's specifications do not give r ise to 
an implied warranty of fitness. That doctrine, 
however, applies only where the buyer furnishes 
precise technical specifications. Compare 
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Independent Metals 
Co. , 203 F.2d 838, 844-845 (8th Cir. 1953) with 
Peters v. Lyons, Iowa, 168 N. W.2d 759 (1969). 
See Uniform Commercial Code, Official Comment 
2 to Section 2-315 n [Emphasis added] 
Other similar cases holding an implied warranty of fitness 
for a particular purpose to ar ise are Mack Trucks of Arkansas, Inc. v. 
Jet Asphalt & Rock Co. , (Ark. 437 S. W.2d 459) where buyer ordered speci-
fic trucks after advising the sel ler of his needs for the same and Boing Air-
plane Co. v. O'Malley (C.A. 8 Minn.) 329 F.2d 585 where the buyer 
advised the seller of particular uses that were intended for the helicopter 
which he purchased from the sel ler and the helicoptor would not perform 
the tasks for which it was intended. One of the tasks intended for the heli-
coptor in the Boing case was to lift a certain amount of weight and the 
helicoptor was incapable of doing this. 
POINT V 
THE CONTRACT SHOULD BE RESCINDED AND THE AMOUNT PAID ON 
THE PURCHASE PRICE RETURNED TO THEM, TOGETHER WITH AN 
AWARD OF CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES. 
It appears there is no question but that what the Plaintiffs 
accepted the boat when it was delivered to them, however, this does not 
preclude rescission of the contract if the product is defective and the sel ler 
fails to remedy the defect. In this regard, Section 70A-2-608, Utah Code 
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Annotated, provides as follows: 
in the fall of 1972 that it was of a "minor nature11 and would be corrected 
with some "adjustments.11 Thereafter the boat was returned by Plaintiffs 
to Duce on approximately six occasions during the boating season of 1973 
and notwithstanding this, the defect was not corrected. 
Plaintiffs concede that the statute requires that notice of 
revocation of acceptance must be given by the buyer to the se l ler . However, 
there is no requirement that this be in writing or that it be in any part icular 
form. In the ins tant case the evidence shows that the Plaintiffs told Duce 
they wanted the defects corrected or a refund of their purchase pr ice . 
- 2 0 -
m 
l!70A~2-608. Revocation of acceptance in 
whole or in part . - (1) The buyer may revoke 
his acceptance of a lot or commercial unit 
whose nonconformity substantially impairs its m 
value to him if he has accepted it. 
(a) on the reasonable assumption that its 
nonconformity would be cured and it has not been • 
seasonably cured; or 
(b) without discovery of such nonconformity 
if his acceptance was reasonably induced either « 
by the difficulty of discovery before acceptance « 
or by the se l le r ' s assurances. 
' p 
n(2) Revocation of acceptance must occur within i 
a reasonable time after the buyer discovers or 
should have discovered the ground for it and § 
before any substantial change in condition of the • 
goods which is not caused by their own defects* 
It is not effective until the buyer notifies the B 
sel ler of i t . i 
"(3) A buyer who so revokes has the same rights • 
and duties with regard to the goods involved as if • 
he had rejected them. M 
Duce assured Plaintiffs after the defect was first discovered • 
(R. 207, 237) The defect was not remedied, nor was the purchase price 
returned and, thus, the lawsuit which prayed for a rescission of the contract 
was filed on September 13, 1973. (R. 1) 
With regard to the position of the Plaintiffs that no writing 
or other particular form of notice of rescission is required, the editors 
in Anderson Uniform Commercial Code, 2nd Edition, Vol. 2 at page 245, 
provides in part as follows: 
MNo particular form or content is specified 
by the Code for revocation of accep tance . . . . 
!lAny conduct clearly manifesting a desire of 
the buyer to get his money back is sufficient 
notice to revoke. Thus, a refusal to permit 
the seller to make repairs may be sufficient 
manifestation by the buyer of intent to revoke 
acceptance and cancel the contract.? ! [Emphasis 
added] 
Once the buyer justifiably revokes the acceptance of the goods 
he is entitled to a refund of the amount paid by him for the purchase pr ice, 
together with any provable consequential damages. In this regard, 
Section 70A-2-711, Utah Code Annotated, provides in part as follows: 
nBuyer fs remedies in general - BuyerTs 
security interest in rejected goods. - (1) 
Where the sel ler fails to make delivery or 
repudiates or the buyer rightfully rejects or 
justifiably revokes acceptance then with 
respect to any goods involved, and with respect 
to the whole if the breach goes to the whole 
contract (section 70A-2-612), the buyer may 
cancel and whether or not he has done so may 
in addition to recovering so much of the price 
as has been paid 
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n(3) On rightful rejection or justifiable 
revocation of acceptance a buyer has a security 
interest in goods in his possession or control* 
for any payments made on their price and any 
expenses reasonably incurred in their inspec-
tion, receipt, transportation, care and custody 
and may hold such goods and rese l l them in 
like manner as an aggrieved sel ler (section 
70A-2-706). , ! 
The position of the Plaintiffs that in addition to recovering the 
amount paid by them for the purchase price, they are entitled to recover 
any additional damages which they can prov^ is supported by the authorities. 
Anderson Uniform Commercial Code, 2nd Edition, Vol. 2 at page 416 states 
as follows: 
has never been returned or tendered to them and thus there can be no 
cancellation of the contract is clearly set forth by subparagraph three of 
the buyer who has rejected defective goods a security interest in them and 
the right to retain the same until the purchase price has been refunded. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence which must be viewed in the light most favorable 
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 Section 2-711-10. Money recovery by buyer • 
on cancellation. A buyer effectively cancelling
 a 
a sales contract is entitled to return of any money 
paid by him and damages. The remedies of can- • 
ceilation and damages are available concurrently « 
and not in the alternative. Thus, if a buyer has 
made a trade in as part of the sales transaction P 
which is thereafter cancelled, the buyer is i 
entitled to recover, in addition to damages, the 
part of the purchase price he has paid in money • 
and the value of the property given as a trade in. f l i 
[Emphasis added] 
i 
The answer to the contention by Duce that the boat in question i 
i 
Section 70A-2-711, Utah Code Annotated, quoted above. This statute gives > 
to Plaintiffs1 theory of the case, clearly shows that the boat purchased 
by the Plaintiffs from Duce is defective and fails to function as a water skr 
boat which is the pr imary purpose for which it was purchased. It also 
establishes that express representations were made by Starfire to Plaintiffs 
concerning the compatibility of the boat hull, engine and jet drive in question 
which were made in the presence of Duce prior to the time the contract was 
entered into and constituted f!the basis of the bargain!1 
The evidence also clearly establishes that Duce was engaged 
in the selling of power boats and, in fact, sold the boat in question to the 
Plaintiffs and therefore it is a "merchant with respect to goods of that kind" 
and is bound by the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness. 
As a result of the breach of the express warranties and the 
implied warranties of merchantability and of fitness for the particular 
purpose for which the boat was purchased, the Plaintiffs are entitled to 
rescission of the contract and a refund of the amount of the purchase price 
paid by them, together with any consequential damages which they have 
incurred. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Carman E. Kipp and 
J . Anthony Eyre 
Kipp and Christian 
520 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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Mailed a copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellants to 
Dean E. Conder, Attorney for Defendant/Respondent Duce, 410 Newhouse 
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; Paul N. Cotro-Manes, Attorney for 
Third Party Defendant Starfire, 430 Judge Building, Salt Lake City, Utah » 
84111; and to W. Brent Wilcox, Attorney for Third Party Defendant Hardin, " 
Deseret Plaza Building, Salt Liake City, Utah 84111, this 21st day of 
November, 1975. • 
n 
Secretary 
i 
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